For online sellers

Stop asking your buyer to take your word for it.

Seal the parcel. Your buyer checks the seal in their own browser — no account, no app, and no reason to trust you or us. Signing what you say is inside it is paused; see step 4.

What works today

The seals and all four devices are for sale at zknot.io. The seal check works now. SelfKnot, Vitni Plus and Ostensor prove themselves live at verifyknot.io/start. A unit whose key is not enrolled on the rail verifies as SELF-ASSERTED and is labelled "not a registered unit". Vitni does not verify there yet. Signing a file into a public record is paused (step 4 below). If you sell something worth arguing about, talk to us.

Every record in a dispute has the same author

When a buyer says it arrived opened, or that it is not the item in the photos, the evidence on your side is a photograph you took and a tracking number from a carrier. Both were produced by the party being asked about. There is nothing an outsider can check, so the dispute is settled by platform policy — which is to say, by whichever of you is more expensive to lose.

A named device confirmed something specific about a specific parcel at a specific time, and your buyer can check it without trusting either of us.

That sentence is the whole offer. If a claim does not fit inside it, we do not make it.

Your side — about 90 seconds per order

  1. Pack and photograph the item.

    Nothing about how you work changes here.

  2. Write the one line you would stand behind in a dispute.

    “Graded PSA 9, cert 88412093, no case damage, packed by SW.” Put it in a file — a note, the packing slip, or the photo itself.

  3. Close the box and apply a seal across the closure.

    Destructive-open construction: it has to be destroyed to get in. Each seal is individually serialized and carries a QR to its own public record. Record the seal code against the order.

  4. Sign the file with your device — paused.

    This step does not produce a record today. Our signing page checks a device's signature in your browser, but it does not issue a public record or a code to put on the slip. We paused issuing rather than weaken how the public rail decides who may write to it, and it is being redesigned. Until then, keep the file. Its hash is what a future record would carry, and nothing about it changes.

  5. Put the seal code on the packing slip and in the shipping email.

    The seal code answers was it opened? A signing code that answers what did they say was in it? comes back when issuing does.

Their side — about 15 seconds, no account

Before opening

They scan the seal. It resolves to a public record showing that this seal was registered, and when. If the seal is voided, they can see that before they touch anything.

After opening — paused

Checking a signing code needs a signing record, and those are not being issued right now (step 4). The seal record above is live and unaffected.

Months later — the loop that pays for the other two

An investigator, a platform reviewer, a chargeback team or a court reads the same public record without either party's cooperation and without an account. The lookup endpoint is unauthenticated by design. That is the point of the whole thing: the record outlives the argument, and it does not need you to be around.

Check a real record, right now

Everything below runs in your browser. The page fetches record data from the public rail, then re-computes the signature locally using the same verifier your buyer would use. If our server's verdict ever disagreed with the math your machine just ran, this would say so — that disagreement is a finding, not something we hide.

Idle

Both sample records are real. ZK-2NMF-779 is the first clean production seal. ZK-7XRY-337 is OS-0004, our internal reference device — it is not for sale, and it is the only article on the rail whose hardening has been measured rather than labelled. It is shown here because it is the honest top of the ladder today.

Four articles. One question separates them.

They all hold a key in a secure element and sign a challenge. What differs is how much the rail is willing to say about the machine around that key — and we would rather show you that table than sell past it.

ArticleIdentity rungPress gateDistinctiveAvailability
SelfKnot KEY-REGISTERED once enrolled on the rail; SELF-ASSERTED on /start until then Tested — signs if and only if the button is pressed Firmware is open and user-replaceable. That is deliberate, and it is the product For sale · verifies on /start
Vitni KEY-REGISTERED once enrolled on the rail Rev 2 The middle rung For sale · does not verify on /start yet: its firmware uses a different command set, and /start does not speak it
Vitni Plus KEY-REGISTERED once enrolled on the rail; SELF-ASSERTED on /start until then Yes — an unarmed press is refused and produces nothing The first fleet cleared for sale For sale · verifies on /start (SELF-ASSERTED until enrolled on the rail)
Ostensor KEY-REGISTERED once enrolled, or REGISTERED on measured hardening; SELF-ASSERTED on /start until enrolled Physical button; the strong-form gate is not built A screen. It shows you the digest and refuses to sign if what it showed is not what it would sign For sale · verifies on /start (SELF-ASSERTED until enrolled on the rail)

The seals

2×1 in destructive-open polyester. Passive — no electronics, no battery, nothing to fail. Each one is individually serialized and registered before it ships. You can put three lines of your own text on them (store name up to 16 characters, two more lines up to 22), printed in a zone kept visually separate from ours so it is never mistaken for something we are vouching for. We do not store that text.

What this does not do

It does not prove your claim was true
It proves what was claimed, by which device, at what time, and that the seal was intact. Whether the item matched the description is still a human judgement. What changes is that the argument moves from whose word to whose record.
A seal makes no claim about contents
It is tamper-evident, never tamper-proof. It records that a serialized seal was registered, and its own destruction is visible. It says nothing about what was behind it.
Registration vouches for a key, not for a machine
On the KEY-REGISTERED rung the key is on file and was generated inside a secure element it has never left — but the device around it is not attested, and a modified unit signs with the same registered key. The demo above prints this in the rail's own words rather than ours.
We do not yet publish our registry key where you can check it
Half of what you saw above is independent: your browser re-verified the signature against the key carried in the record. Whether that key is one ZKNOT vouches for is currently reported by ZKNOT. Until we publish it out-of-band, treat that half as our assertion. We would rather say so than let it read as grounding it is not.
Records are tamper-evident, not immutable
The chain is hash-linked and served publicly, so alteration is detectable. Nobody should tell you it is impossible.
Signing needs a desktop
Web Serial is desktop Chrome, Edge or Opera. Your buyer verifies on anything; you sign at a computer. This is a high-value, low-volume motion today.

We are looking for a first seller, not a hundred

A pilot is one device, a strip of personalized seals, and a direct line to the person who built it. In exchange we want to hear where the workflow breaks — particularly around tying a record to an order number, which is the part we are least happy with.

Ask about the pilot Live rail Articles in qualification